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CHAPTER 12 
Labor Relations Law 
ROBERT M. SEGAL 
§12.1. General. This chapter consists of the decisions of the 
United States Supreme Court, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit, the United States District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts and the Supreme Judicial Court, and legislation con-
cerned with labor relations law during the 1967 SURVEY year - Sep-
tember 1, 1966 through August 31, 1967. 
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
§12.2. Work preservation clauses. In National Woodwork Manu-
facturers Ass'n v. NLRB,l the Supreme Court upheld a collective bar-
gaining provision between the Carpenters Union and the Association 
of Construction Contractors in the Philadelphia area, which provided 
that no member of the union would handle prefabricated doors. The 
work of cutting and fitting doors had traditionally been performed on 
the job site by the carpenters involved. In reversing in part the Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,2 the Supreme Court upheld the 
NLRB's decision3 that the refusal to handle prefitted doors was de-
signed to preserve work for the employees involved and, therefore, 
was a primary and not a secondary dispute. It was, thus, not viola-
tive of Section 8(e) and its corollary, Section 8(b)(4)(A) of the National 
Labor Relations Act. Section 8(e) was not intended to prohibit agree-
ments made and maintained to preserve for employees work tradi-
tionally done by them.4 
The Court also upheld the Board's finding that the enforcement of 
the rule did not violate Section 8(b)(4)(B) which prohibits boycotts or 
refusals to handle. The enforcement of the contract was directed 
against the contractor who had control over the project and not 
against any other employer. Hence, the action of the employees was 
ROBERT M. SEGAL is a partner in the law firm of Segal & Flamm in Boston. He 
is co· chairman of the Labor Management Relations Committee of the Boston Bar 
Association, former chairman of the Labor Relations Law Section of the American 
Bar Association, and a lecturer on Labor Law at the Harvard Business School. 
The author wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of his associate, 
John D. O'Reilly, III. 
§12.2 1386 U.s. 612, rehearing denied, 387 U.S. 926 (1967). 
2354 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1965). 
3 149 N.L.R.B. 646 (1964). 
4386 U.s. at 640·641. 
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primary in nature, in that the confrontation was only with their 
immediate employer. The Board's decision that the enforcement of 
the rule against three other contractors who held no control over the 
work because of project specifications was violative of Section 8(b)(4)-
(B) was not appealed by the union.a 
In a companion case, Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. 
NLRB,6 the Court, reversing in part the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit,1 upheld the Board's decisions that a no-subcontract 
clause is legal in the construction industry and can be enforced both 
by the local entitled to the construction work on the job site and by 
members of a sister local employed by the same manufacturer.9 The 
Court of Appeals had reversed the Board, in part, reasoning that en-
forcement action by a sister local violated Section 8(b)(4)(B) by forc-
ing the employer to cease doing business with the subcontractor. In 
reversing, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that any situa-
tion created by employees which involves their employer is a dispute 
which is their own and is not secondary.10 Therefore, such action is 
not a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (B), which states that "nothing con-
tained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where 
not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing." 
Both National Woodwork and Houston Insulation give a special 
place, especially in the construction industry, to work preservation 
clauses. These clauses, provided the relationship involved is primary, 
are protected against an attack from the secondary boycott sections of 
the National Labor Relations Act.11 Where the tactical object of the 
agreement or the boycott is the employer of the employees, and the 
agreement or boycott is for the benefit of those employees, then the 
clause and its enforcement are legitimate. On the other hand, where the 
objective is "tactically calculated to satisfy union objectives elsewhere," 
the use of economic pressure is forbidden.12 "The touchstone," it is 
a This "control test" of the NLRB was not before the Court, but the fact that 
the dissenters in this case and Houston Insulation Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 
386 U.S. 664 (1967), speak of control as irrelevant, and the fact that the thrust 
of the majority'S argument would not allow the introduction of a third party 
with "control" of the work assignment to render secondary that which would 
otherwise be a primary work preservation dispute, call into question the viability 
of this doctrine. 
6386 U.S. 664 (1967). 
7357 F.2d 182 (5th Cir. 1966). 
S 148 N.L.R.B. 866 (1964). 
9 The majority read Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945), 
noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.4; 1965 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §15.2, as 
prohibiting boycott activities which have the object of affecting conditions else-
where than with one's own employer. The Houston case was limited to exerciSing 
economic pressure by one group of employees to secure benefits for other. employees 
of the same employer. 
10386 U.S. at 668-669. 
11 Labor Management Relations Act §8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.s.C. §158(b)(4)(B) (1964), as 
amended. [Hereinafter cited as LMRA.] 
12 National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n v. NLRB, 386 U.S. at 644. 
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stated, "is whether the agreement or its maintenance is addressed to 
the labor relations of the contracting employer vis-a-vis his own em-
ployees."13 -
- §12.3.Right of union to impose fines. The United States Supreme 
Court in NLRBv. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing CO.,1 upheld the 
right of a union to impose fines and seek damages in a court action 
against its members who, in violation of a union rule, crossed the 
union's authorized picket lines during a lawful strike. The National 
Labor Relations Board had found that even if the conduct was "re-
straint and coercion" and prevented the union members from exercis-
ing rights, guaranteed in Section 7, to "refrain from" concerted 
activities, the fines were not a violation of Section 8(b)(I)(A).2 The 
Board reasoned that to rule otherwise would be a prohibited imposi-
tion on the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own member-
ship rules.3 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed,4 
holding that the local's conduct violated Section 8(b)(I)(A). The Su-
preme Court, in reversing the court of appeals, held that even if this 
action could be characterized as restraint and coercion, it is not the 
"restraint and coercion" forbidden by Section 8(b)(I)(A).5 Unlike the 
NLRB, the Court did not rely upon the provis06 to that section, but 
concluded from the legislative history that it was never the intent of 
the section to impose restrictions on the union's traditional power, as 
an incident or corollary of the contract between the union and its 
members, to impose reasonable fines and seek their enforceability in 
the courts. 
§12.4. Inherently destructive behavior. In NLRB v. Great Dane 
Trailers, Inc.,! the employer refused to pay striking employees vaca-
tion benefits accrued under a terminated collective bargaining agree-
ment. The employer announced an intention to pay such benefits to 
non-strikers. The Board held that such action constituted a dis-
crimination in terms and conditions of employment which would 
discourage union membership and was, therefore, an unfair labor 
practice under Section 8(a)(3).2 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
13 Id. at 645. 
§12.3. 1388 U.S. 175 (1967), noted in 9 B.C. Ind. &: Com. L. Rev. 221 (1967). 
2149 N.L.R.B. 67 (1964). 
3Id. at 69. 
4358 F.2d 656 (7th Cir. 1966). 
5 "Restraint and coercion" previously had been limited to physical force and 
threats and to economic reprisals in Perry Norvell, 80 N.L.R.B. 225, 239 (1948). 
In NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274(1960). the United States Supreme 
Court made it clear that economic pressure through picketing, recognitional or 
otherwise, was not within the orbit of Section 8(b)(I). 
6 The provisio to Section 8 states in relevant part: ". . • Provided, That this 
paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own 
rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein ..•. " 
§12.4 1338 U.S. 26 (1967), noted in9 B.C. Ind. &: Com. L. Rev. 213 (1967). 
2150 N.L.R.B. 438 (1964). 
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Circuit denied enforcement of the Board's order believing that the 
possibility of motivation by legitimate business purposes was suf-
ficient to overcome the "unfair labor practice."s The Supreme Court 
reversed with directions to enforce the Board's order. The Court held 
that the employer's conduct was inherently destructive, i.e., "conduct 
[which] carries with it 'unavoidable consequences which the employer 
not only foresaw but which he must have intended.' "4 
Even in the light of legitimate motivation, therefore, the action 
would be a violation of Section 8(a)(3).5 If, on the other hand, the 
employer's conduct results in a "comparatively slight" infringement 
on employee rights, a showing of substantial and legitimate business 
motivation creates a presumption of legality.6 
§12.5. Board's power to construe a contract. In two other cases 
decided during the 1967 SURVEY year, the United States Supreme 
Court clarified the relation between the use of grievance and arbitra-
tion procedures and recourse to the Board to construe a contract in 
unfair labor practice cases. In NLRB v. C & C Plywood,1 the Court up-
held the power of the Board to construe a contract, but only insofar 
as it was necessary to determine the existence of an unfair labor prac-
tice. In the instant case, the employer had instituted a premium pay 
plan at an identical rate for workers previously possessing different 
pay rates. This action was taken during the contract term without 
prior consultation with the union. Although the contract provided 
for grievances, but not for final arbitration, and although the em-
ployer maintained that he had a contractual right to take unilateral 
action, the Board found that the employer refused to bargain col-
lectively2 and interfered with rights guaranteed to the employees.s 
This ruling was reversed by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit4 on the grounds that the Board did not have jurisdiction to de-
cide a case which depended upon the meaning of the collective bar-
gaining agreement. The Supreme Court, in reversing, held that 
although Congress never intended the NLRB to have plenary power 
to determine the rights of parties under all collective agreements,1i 
this did not deny jurisdiction to the Board to interpret a contract 
where a statutory right is at stake.6 
3363 F.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1966). 
4388 U.S. at 33, quoting, in part, Labor Board v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 
221, 228 (1963), noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.8. 
Ii 388 U.S. at 33-34. 
6Id. at 34. 
§12.5 1385 U.S. 421, rehearing denied, 386 U.S. 939 (1967), noted in 8 B.C. Ind. 
&: Com. L. Rev. 997 (1967). 
2 LMRA §8(a)(5). 
3 Id. §8(c)(1). 
4351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1965). 
Ii See LMRA §301. 
6 The Board's policy of deferring to an arbitration award where "the proceedings 
appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and the 
decision of the arbitration panel is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and 
4
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In the second case, NLRB v. Acme Industrial CO.,7 the Supreme 
Court, in reversing the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, up-
held the Board's finding of a violation of refusal to bargainS where the 
company refused to give the union requested information relative to 
the removal of specific equipment. The company claimed it was justi-
fied by the contract to withhold such information and, in any case, the 
contract had an arbitration clause for any grievances. The court of ap-
peals9 refused to enforce the Board's cease-and-desist order, maintaining 
that since there is a provision for binding arbitration of differ-
ences, the Board had no jurisdiction. In reversing, the Supreme 
Court noted that the Board does not, in this instance, encroach upon 
an arbitrator's prerogative to construe a contract, because the informa-
tion requested was relevant to the union's evaluation of the alleged 
grievance. This may represent the full circle from NLRB v. Truitt 
Manufacturing CO.,10 which held that each case must turn upon its 
particular facts. The result of the present case is to require the parties 
to conform to good bargaining practice by furnishing relevant infor-
mation, which will "be of use to the union in carrying out its statu-
tory duties and responsibilities."ll This entire area of concurrent 
jurisdiction of arbitrators and the Board is open to many questions, 
including the jurisdiction and power of the Board when the contrac-
tual provision for arbitration is urged as a defense to a charge of 
unfair labor practices. 
§12.6. Preemption. The question of preemption was again before 
the Court in Vaca v. Sipes.1 The case involved a suit in the state court 
by a union member alleging that the refusal by the union to take his 
grievance to the final step of arbitration was arbitrary, capricious and 
without just and reasonable cause. His discharge was based on grounds 
of poor health, but since there was conflicting medical evidence the 
union filed and processed a grievance. When a new doctor's report 
did not support the union member, the union declined to take the 
matter to arbitration. The employee brought suit against the union 
in the state court and won compensatory and punitive damages. The 
Supreme Court of Missouri upheld the jurisdiction of the state court.2 
Although the union action is at least arguably an unfair labor prac-
tice, subject to the NLRB,3 the United States Supreme Court held 
that the duty of fair representation is a judicially developed doctrine 
policies of the Act." Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955), does not 
deprive the Board of jurisdiction under Section lO(a). See International Harvester 
Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-926 (1962). 
7385 U.S. 432 (1967). 
S LMRA §8(a)(5). 
9351 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1965). 
10351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
11385 U.S. at 437. 
§12.6. 1386 U.S. 17I (1967), noted in 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 662 (1967). 
2397 S.W.2d 658 (Mo. 1965). 
8 LMRA §8(b)(I)(a). See also Miranda Fuel. 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962). 
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subject to the jurisdiction of the state courts.4 The Court outlined the 
federal standards of fair representation as follows: (1) a union may 
not arbitrarily refuse to process a grievance; (2) a breach of the duty 
occurs when a union's conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad 
faith; (3) the individual· employee has no absolute right to have his 
grievance taken to arbitration; and (4) the arbitration procedure as-
sumes that each party will endeavor in good faith to settle grievances 
short of arbitration.5 In the instant case, the Court reversed for failure 
to apply a federal standard, since the state court did not take into 
account that a meritorious grievance might not be processed in good 
faith. This case leaves open many questions including the problem of 
remedies, the problem of separate suits against the employer and the 
possible inconsistent results by the NLRB and the courts in separate 
cases.6 
B. FIRST CIRCUIT COURT OF ApPEALS DECISIONS 
§12.7. Bargaining unit. The insistence by the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit that the National Labor Relations Board articu-
late with precision its reasons for selecting a particular unit of 
employees for a bargaining unit was again manifested in this SURVEY 
year. In NLRB v. Purity Food Stores, Inc.,1 the court rejected the 
Board's conclusion that a single retail food store in a chain of seven 
stores was an appropriate bargaining unit. In the court's view, the 
findings of the Board as to the extent of centralization of the chain 
store's integrated operations2 were incompatible with the Board's 
determination that the unionization of one store would not unduly 
disrupt the operation of the chain.8 The reluctance of the court to 
accept the Board's determination may have been influenced by the 
fact that within the past five years the position of the Board on this 
question has undergone complete reversal. 
Until 1962, the Board had ruled that, in all retail chain stores, not 
4. The Court based its finding of state jurisdiction on the reasoning set out in 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R .• 323 U.S. 192 (1944). The concurring opinion 
rejected any notion of concurrent jurisdiction and held that a breach of the duty 
of fair representation is an unfair labor practice and subject to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the NLRB. 386 U.S. at 198. See also Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 
181 (1962). noted in 1963 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §14.8; Local 12, United Rubber 
Workers, 150 N.L.R.B. 312 (1964). 
5 See 386 U.s. 171 (1967). 
6 This very situation may soon present itself since the discharged employee is 
now suing the employer for breach of contract. 
§12.7. 1376 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1967). ' .,' , 
2 This evidence included finding that there was extensive' interchaQ,ge~L em· 
ployees among the stores, the chain used centralized personnel policies, and cen· 
tralized decisions were made as to hiring and firing, wage and job classification, 
and merchandising. 
8376 F.2d at 501·502. 
6
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necessarily limited to food stores, the appropriate unit should include 
employees of all stores in a geographic area or administrative division 
pf the employer.4 
In 1962, however, the Board reconsidered this policy in its decision 
in Sav-On Drugs.5 In that case, the union sought to represent separate 
units of the employer's chain of stores. The Regional Director of the 
NLRB, in denying the union's petition, ruled that the appropriate 
bargaining unit in cases involving retail chain stores, should embrace 
the employees of all the stores within a definable administrative divi-
sion or geographic area. On appeal, the NLRB ruled: 
In our opinion that policy [the Director's] has overemphasized 
the administrative grouping of merchandising outlets at the ex-
pense of factors such as geographic separation of the several out-
lets and the local managerial autonomy of the separate out-
lets .... We have decided to modify this policy and to apply to 
retail chain operations the same unit policy we apply to multi-
plant enterprises in general. Therefore, whether a proposed unit 
which is confined to one of two or more retail establishments 
making up an employer's retail chain is appropriate will be de-
termined in the light of all the circumstances of the case.6 
By 1964 the destruction of the rule was completed by the Board's 
ruling that single-store units were presumptively appropriate.7 Rather 
than accept this blanket presumption, the court now seems to be re-
quiring an affirmative showing by the Board that the single-store unit 
would not create undue friction in labor relations in the operation of 
the entire retail chain.s 
In an analogous situation, the NLRB recently changed its position 
concerning the appropriate bargaining unit for truck drivers. Tra-
ditionally, the Board had automatically included truck drivers in the 
more comprehensive bargaining units of warehouse employees.9 In 
1962, however, the Board ruled that such cases would henceforth be 
decided on the standard criteria for determining community of in-
terest, and that each case would be decided on its merits.lO These 
criteria include the following: (1) whether the workers have related 
or diverse activities, modes of compensation, wages, hours, supervision 
4 Robert Hall Clothes, 118 N.L.R.B. 1096 (1957). 
5 138 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1962). 
6 Id. at 1033. 
7 Frisch's Big Boy Ill-Mar, Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 551 (1964) (representation pro-
ceeding); 151 N.L.R.B. 454 (1965) (order); enf. denied, NLRB v. Frisch's Big Boy 
Ill-Mar, Inc., 356 F.2d 895 (7th Cir. 1966). 
S The alleged failure of the Board, however, to abide by the requirements in 
Purity that it state with sufficient clarity the reason for its single-store determina-
tion does not serve as the basis for a district court injunction of the election in the 
designated bargaining unit. Big Y Supermarkets v. McCulloch, 263 F. Supp. 175 
(D. Mass. 1967). 
9 Challenge-Cooke Bros., 129 N.L.R.B. 1235 (1961). 
10 Koester Bakery Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 1006 (1962). 
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or other conditions of employment; and (2) whether the workers are 
engaged iIi the same or related production process.ll 
In NLRB v. Chamberland Farms, Inc.,12 the Board had determined 
that truck drivers could be included in the more comprehensive bar-
gaining unit of production workers. The Board based its determina-
tion on a finding of community of interest between the truck drivers 
and the production workers.13 On appeal, the court of appeals re-
versed, remanding the case for further findings to support the Board's 
determination of the existence of a community of interest. The court, 
in remanding, noted that the Board's reliance on the fact of uniform 
fringe benefits for both the truck drivers and production workers was 
insufficient, in itself, to support a finding of community of interest.14 
Both Cumberland Farms and Purity Foods involved situations 
where the Board had recently changed its position concerning de-
termination of the appropriate bargaining unit. Both decisions by 
the court of appeals may be interpreted as a dissatisfaction by the 
court with the Board's application of its new method of determina-
tion. It would appear that if the Board is to have any success in the 
courts, in upholding Board determinations, it must further define 
and more carefully apply the criteria it is now using in determining 
appropriate bargaining units. 
§12.8. Membership cards. The First Circuit Court of Appeals was 
presented with several cases, during the 1967 SURVEY year, involving 
the interpretation and effect of union membership cards. In NLRB v. 
Freeport Marble &- Tile CO.,l the court ruled that membership cards 
signed by a majority of employees may not be relied upon as a basis 
for a bargaining order after an election has been lost, where the pur-
pose of the cards in question is limited to obtaining an election, 
rather than for unconditional membership. The court admonished 
the union for the lack of clarity in the wording of the membership 
cards,2 and indicated a reluctance to enforce a bargaining order based 
on such ambiguously worded cards.3 In NLRB v. Gorbea, Perez &-
Morell,4 the court held that just as an employee may not be heard to 
complain that he intended an unconditional membership card to be 
limited to use in a petition for election,5 so also will the court refuse 
11 Id. at 1011. 
12370 F.2d 54 (1st Cir. 1966). 
13 Id. at 57. 
14 Id. 
§12.8. 1367 F.2d 371 (1st Cir. 1966). 
2 Id. at 372·373. 
3Id. at 373. 
4300 F.2d 886 (1st Cir. 1962). 
5 Where, however, the union solicits an unconditional membership card from 
an employee on the oral representation that the card is solely for the purpose of 
demanding an election, the courts will refuse to interpret the card as a general 
membership card. See Cunningham, The Congressional Labor Agenda: National 
Emergency Strikes and Other Problems in Search of Solution, 8 B.C. Ind. &: Com. 
L. Rev. 735, 745·746 (1967). 
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to entertain a union's claim that membership cards, which are on 
their face conditional upon an election, were actually intended as 
general membership cards.6 
In NLRB v. Southbridge Sheet Metal Works,7 the union solicited 
membership cards from a majority of the company's non-clerical em-
ployees. The membership cards conferred upon the union the power 
to represent the signed employee for purposes of collective bargaining, 
and were to remain in "full force and effect for one year from date 
and thereafter, subject to thirty (30) days' written notice of my [em-
ployee's] desire to withdraw such power and authority to act for 
me .... "8 The employer refused to bargain with the union, and the 
union submitted to a consent election, which it lost. 
The union filed an objection to the election with the Regional Di-
rector of the NLRB.9 The Director recommended that the election be 
set aside, which recommendation was adopted by the Board at a for-
mal hearing. The employer appealed, contending that the union had 
waived any unfair labor practice charges by consenting to the elec-
tion. In affirming the Board's decision, the court of appeals specifically 
adopted a Board ruling, previously announced in Bernel Foam 
Products,1O that even if a union lost a consent election, it could seek 
an order to bargain based on a showing (1) that the union had a 
majority of employees signed before election; and (2) that this ma-
jority was destroyed by illegal conduct by the employer prior to the 
election.11 
The employer challenged the validity of the membership cards 
solicited by the union, contending that the thirty-day notice require-
ment in the cards constituted an invalid restriction on the power of 
the employee to withdraw approval of authority of the union to bar-
gain in behalf of the employee. Both the Board and the court con-
ceded the restriction to be invalid.12 The court, however, found that 
there was no evidence that the employees understood that their right 
of withdrawal was restricted. The court held that "under these cir-
cumstances, we do not think that respondent [employer] has met its 
burden of showing that employees underwent a change of mind or 
were prohibited [by the withdrawal restriction] from manifesting 
it."13 It would appear, thus, that where there are patently invalid 
6 300 F.2d at 888. 
765 L.R.R.M. 2916 (1st Cir. 1967). 
8Id. at 2919. 
9 The union objected to activities of the employer which it alleged were in 
violation of LMRA §8(a)(I). 
10146 N.L.R.B. 1277 (1964). 
1165 L.R.R.M. at 2917. 
12Id. at 2919. The court admonished the union for the invalid language in the 
cards in the following language: "We cannot emphasize too strongly our disap-
proval of such clauses, and we express our hope that the Board will make all 
feasible efforts to bring about the elimination of such unwarranted representations 
on authorization cards." Id. 
13Id. 
9
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restrictions on solicited membership cards, these cards may still be 
used as a basis for a bargaining order, unless the employer can carry 
the burden of proving that the invalid restrictions affected employee 
action. 
§12.9. Other litigation. In three per curiam opinions, the circuit 
court affirmed decisions of the NLRB. In the first, NLRB v. Mc-
Cormick Longmeadow Stone CO.,l the court held that evidence, in-
cluding evidence of the employer's opposition to unionization of his 
employees and of the employer's remarks to the employee after dis-
charging him, supported the NLRB's finding that the discharge was 
discriminatory under Section 8(a)(3) of the act2 even though the em-
ployee was also guilty of conduct which would have warranted dis-
charge. In Machaby v. NLRB,3 the court upheld the Board's dismissal 
of a union's complaint of an unfair labor practice. A union steward 
had instructed the employees that if they were asked to work in a 
particular locality, which in reality was not "dangerous," they were 
to see him and he would "advise" them not to work there. This was 
an improper instruction and adequate cause for discharge. In the 
third case, NLRB v. Tower Iron Works Inc.} the court enforced a 
Board order forbidding the employer from recognizing an indepen-
dent union unless and until it won a Board-conducted election. The 
independent union had been recognized at a time when the interna-
tional union, which dealt with the multi-employer association of 
which the employer had been a member for over ten years, had not 
been notified of the dissolution of the association. The international 
union was, in fact, affirmatively misled by the employer into believ-
ing that the association was still in existence and had therefore con-
tinued to attempt to deal with the association rather than with the 
individual employer. In effect, the employer had not only frustrated 
any further joint bargaining, but also deterred its employees from 
separate bargaining. 
C. DISTRICT COURT FOR MASSACHUSETTS DECISIONS 
§12.10. Jurisdiction. In two petitions by the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, the district court indicated that, before issuing injunctive 
relief pending the completion of a Board hearing, it would insist on 
something more than the statutory requirement of "reasonable cause 
to believe" that a violation of the National Labor Relations Act has 
occurred.1 Not only must it be clear that the applicable law has been 
§12.9. 1 S74 F.2d 81 (1st Cir. 1967). See also NLRB v. Pioneer Plastics Corp., 
65 L.R.R.M. 2676 (1st Cir. 1967), cert. denied, S89 U.S. 929; NLRB v. Gass, 65 
L.R.R.M. 2221 (1st Cir. 1967). 
2 S74 F.2d at 82. 
3 S77 F.2d 59 (1st Cir. 1967) . 
• S66 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 1966). 
§12.l0. 1 Hoban v. Local 4, Operating Engineers, 65 L;R.R.M. SOOg, SOlI (D. 
Mass. 1967). 
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violated, it must also be shown that injunctive relief would be "just 
and proper" under the circumstances of the case.2 Among the factors 
which determine the propriety of such injunctive relief are whether 
the conduct was a clear violation of the law and whether the viola-
tion is causing irreparable injury.3 
Two cases of first impression contributed to the seemingly endless 
litany of cases under Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act. 
In Keay v. Eastern Air LinesJ4 a petition to set aside an arbitration 
award, a matter ordinarily within the state court's jurisdiction,1i was 
dismissed since the award came within the coverage of the Railway 
Labor Act provision for exclusive review in a federal court.6 As the 
federal court's removal jurisdiction was dependent on the state court's 
original jurisdiction, the petition was dismissed.7 In United States 
Lines Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n,s the court ruled that 
it had admiralty jurisdiction over a suit for breach of a collective 
bargaining agreement of a maritime nature. In such suits, however, 
the evolving principles formulated under Section 301 will be applica-
ble with the one outstanding exception that in admiralty trials the 
parties do not have the full right to a trial by jury. 
§12.11. Excelsior rule. The much debated and litigated Excelsior1 
rule, which requires an employer to furnish the name and address of 
each employee before an election, was upheld in NLRB v. Wyman 
Gordon CO. J2 in which the court joined the majority of jurisdictions3 
ruling that such a rule was enforceable as a valid exercise of the 
Board's rule-making powers. This insures reasonable means of access 
to voters in an election without violating either the employees' right 
to privacy or those provisions of the act prohibiting an employer 
from delivering a "thing of value" to a union representative.4 
§12.12. Other litigation. In Local 2, Te(ephone Workers v. Inter-
national Brotherhood of Telephone Workers,! the district court inter-
preted Section 462 of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure 
2Id. 
3 Greene v. Pollard Co., 258 F. Supp. 475 (D. Mass. 1966). In secondary boycott 
injunctions the irreparable injury must apparently be inflicted on the neutral 
party rather than tlle primary employer. Hoban v. Local 205, U.E., 64 L.R.R.M. 
2142 (D. Mass. 1966). 
4267 F. Supp. 77 (D. Mass. 1967). 
5 See Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). 
645 U.S.C. §159 (1964). 
7 See Freeman v. Bee Machine Co., 319 U.S. 448 (1943). 
S 265 F. Supp. 666 (D. Mass. 1966). 
§12.1I. 1 See Excelsior Underwear, 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
2 65 L.R.R.M. 2763 (D. Mass. 1967). 
3 Since tlle court's decision two additional decisions have approved the Excelsior 
doctrine. NLRB v. Hanes Hosiery Division, 66 L.R.R.M. 2264 (4tll Cir. 1967): 
NLRB v. Beech-Nut Life Savers, 66 L.R.R.M. 2327 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
465 L.R.R.M. at 2766. 
§12.l2. 1261 F. Supp. 433 (D. Mass. 1966). 
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Act2 as prohibiting an international union from imposing a trustee-
ship on an affiliated local unless the international constitution or by-
laws expressly state the procedure to be followed in such proceedings. 
The recitation in the union constitution that trusteeships may be 
imposed by the international was held to be insufficient when not 
coupled with a statement of the manner or procedure under which 
the trusteeship should be imposed. 
In Local Joint Executive Board v. Joden Inc.,s the court determined 
that principles of federal law which require a successor employer to 
abide by the arbitration provisions of his predecessor's collective bar-
gaining agreement4 apply to an employer whose operation is too 
small to come within the Labor Board's self-imposed jurisdictional 
standards, II yet which has more than a de minimis effect on interstate 
commerce. 
In a civil action against a labor union by a workman for petition 
for readmission, the court in Stone v. Local 29, Boilermakers6 held 
that the workman who conceded that he was validly suspended from 
union membership was not a "member" within the Landrum-Griffin 
Law's definition of members of a labor organization.7 Hence, he did 
not have standing to bring the suit under provisions of the statute 
securing rights of members of a labor union.s The court also held 
that denial of his petition for readmission to membership was not a 
violation of the statute governing safeguards against improper dis-
ciplinary action by a labor organization. 
D. MASSACHUSETTS SUPREME JUDICIAL 
COURT DECISIONS 
§12.13. Non-profit organizations. The Supreme Judicial Court 
has twice within the 1967 SURVEY year indicated that it had no inten-
tion of creating judicial inroads on the Saint Luke'sl doctrine, 
wherein the operation of a non.profit hospital was held not to be a 
matter in industry and trade so as to be within the coverage of the 
Massachusetts Labor Relations Act.2 In Memorial Hospital v. Labor 
Relations Commission,s the Court was faced with what was contended 
to be a legislative reversal of the Saint Luke's decision. In Chapter 576 
229 U.S.C. §464 (c) (1964). 
S 262 F. Supp. 390 (D. Mass. 1966). 
4 See Wiley v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964), noted in 1964 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §15.3. 
1\ See Siemons Mailing Service, 122 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958). 
6262 F. Supp. 961 (D. Mass. 1967). 
7Id. at 963. 
SId. 
§12.13. 1 Saint Luke's Hospital v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 320 Mass. 467, 70 
N.E.2d 10 (1946). 
2 G.L., c. 150A. 
8 1967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 165, 23 N.E.2d 527. 
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of the Acts of 1964, Section 3,4 hospitals were, for the first time, in-
cluded in the Labor Relations Act's definition of "employer" so as to 
be subject to the act. Had the statutory amendment gone no further, 
it is likely that the courts would have construed the amendment to 
extend coverage of the act to all hospital employees. As the Court 
noted, however, the 1964 amendment's inclusion of hospitals within 
the definition of "employer" was coupled with the express inclusion 
of hospital nurses within the statutory definition of "employee." The 
Court concluded that the legislative intent was to limit the extension 
of the act's coverage to nursing employees to the exclusion of all other 
hospital employees.5 In a second case, Wheaton College v. Labor Rela-
tions Commission,6 the Court ruled that the Massachusetts Labor 
Relations Act did not extend to the joint operation of a college food 
facility by a non-profit educational institution and a professional 
food management service. 
The continued application of the Saint Luke's doctrine when 
coupled with the recent enactment of legislation granting collective 
bargaining rights to state7 and municipal employees8 has created the 
anomalous situation whereby employees of municipal hospitals and 
educational facilities, long considered the most unprotected employees 
in the labor movement, have greater collective bargaining rights than 
similar employees at private hospitals and facilities. This distinction 
in coverage is, seemingly, based on no apparent or material difference. 
However, as the Court has often noted in the analogous situation in-
volving charitable immunity from tort liability,9 any change in the 
doctrine must emanate from the legislature rather than from the Court. 
One point mentioned by the Court that could create procedural 
problems is its ruling in Wheaton that it was following the policy of 
the NLRB to decline jurisdiction over such operations,lo The decision 
of the Board, however, not to assert its admitted statutory jurisdiction 
over such facilities as educational institutions,n race track enter-
prises,12 real-estate brokers,13 racehorse breeders,14 or other employees 
with more than a de minimis effect on interstate commerce,15 yet be-
low the Board's self-imposed jurisdictional standards,16 is an adminis-
trative one which may be asserted or waived without affecting the 
4 Amending G.L., c. 150A, §2. 
51967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 168-169, 223 N.E.2d at 530. 
61967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1071, 227 N.E.2d 735, also noted in §§12.17, 17.4 infra. 
7 G.L., c. 149, §178F. 
8Id. §§178G-178N. 
9Simpson v. Truesdale Hospital, 338 Mass. 787, 154 N.E.2d 357 (1958). 
101967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1077, 227 N.E.2d at 739. 
11 Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 152 N.L.R.B. 598 (1965). 
12 Hialeah Race Course, Inc., 125 N.L.R.B. 388 (1959). 
13 Seattle Real Estate Board, 130 N.L.R.B. 608 (1961). 
14 William H. Dixon, 130 N.L.R.B. 1204 (1961). 
15 NLRB v. Fainb1att, 306 U.S. 601 (1939). 
16 Siemons Mailing Service, 122 N.L.R.B. 81 (1958). 
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jurisdiction of the Board.17 Thus, an action would not lie to enjoin 
an NLRB proceeding involving Wheaton College, had the NLRB 
exercised its statutory jurisdiction. 
In the Wheaton case, the employer, rather than seeking judicial 
review of an adverse ruling from the state Commission,18 sought and 
was granted a writ of prohibition, denying the Commission jurisdic-
tion to hear the controversy. By allowing this procedure, the Court 
may be inviting the ingenuity of counsel to construe some reason or 
policy why further situations should not be within the jurisdiction 
of the state Commission and, thus, stay state proceedings while a case 
is dragged through the courts.19 The availability of such dilatory pro-
cedures, with the resulting adverse effect on harmonious labor relations, 
will hopefully result in a strict adherence to the general rule that 
decisions of the Commission are reviewable only after a formal de-
cision of the Commission rather than by interlocutory appeal. 
E. MASSACHUSETTS LEGISLATION 
§12.14. General labor laws. The Commissioner of Labor was 
again given the power to suspend the labor laws for women and chil-
dren for two years,! and the general labor laws were amended to 
permit employment of females over eighteen years of age in hospitals.2 
An act was passed providing that the Commissioner of Labor and 
Industries shall set the predetermined wage rates for construction 
apprentices.s A law was finally enacted to protect the safety and 
minimum wage standards for migrant workers.4 The minimum wage 
law was amended to include a two-year statute of limitation for 
criminal and civil actions.1I Still pending before the legislature at the 
time of this writing was a long overdue measure to strengthen the 
weak law regulating the private employment agencies in Massa-
chusetts.6 
§12.15. Employment security. The Employment Security Law1 
was amended so that weekly benefits were increased by $7 or fourteen 
17 NLRB v. WGOK, 66 L.R.R.M. 2338 (5th Cir. 1967). 
18 In the event the union had won the election and the employer chose not to 
bargain, the union could obtain a bargaining order from the Commission. This 
later order is appealable to the courts and ordinarily any objection the employer 
has as to the election may be judicially reviewed only in this type of appeal. Jordan 
Marsh v. Labor Relations Commission, 316 Mass. 748, 56 N.E.2d 915 (1944). 
19 See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. 
Law §13.l0. 
§12.l4. 1 Acts of 1967, c. 12. 
2 Id., c. 95. 
SId. 
4 Id., c. 718. 
II Id., c. 329. 
6 House No. 604 (1967), to amend G.L., c. 140, §§46A·46R, as most recently 
amended by Acts of 1966, c. 729. 
§12.l5. 1 G.L., c. l5lA. 
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percent, in two steps, from $50 to $54 effective November 12, 1967, 
and from $54 to $57 on October 13, 1968. At the same time, the base 
earnings required for eligibility for benefits were increased by 28 per-
cent from $700 to $800, to become effective on November 12, 1967, 
and to $900 to become effective on February 14, 1968. The amount 
earned in new employment, subsequent to unemployment caused by 
a labor dispute, in order for a person to be eligible for unemployment 
benefits was increased to $800.2 A better approach to the problem of 
weekly benefits was adopted by Connecticut which allows a variable 
maximum based on the average weekly wages of industry.s 
A special recess commission was set up to study labor's proposal to 
provide unemployment compensation benefits for persons out of work 
as a result of a labor dispute.4 Both New York and Connecticut have 
laws to this effect.5 Another special commission was voted for an over-
all study of the employment security system.6 
§12.16. Public employment. The basic collective bargaining law 
for municipal employees, Chapter 763 of the Acts of 1965,1 was 
amended during the 1967 SURVEY year in two important respects: 
(1) to limit written collective bargaining contracts in the municipal 
field to a maximum of three years; and (2) to allow for the designa-
tion of a common representative for school committees to deal with 
a superintendency union.2 
A law was passed providing that the question of accepting the law 
establishing a 42-hour week for firefighters in cities and towns may be 
placed on the ballot in municipal elections.3 
F. STUDENT COMMENT 
§12.17. Non-profit organizations: Trade or commerce: Wheaton 
College v. Labor Relations Commission.1 Wheaton College, a non-
profit Massachusetts educational institution, had undertaken the con-
tract obligation of providing food and dining room facilities for its 
2 Acts of 1967. c. 480. 
a Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §31-232(a) (1960). as amended, Pub. Acts 589, §1 (1961). 
4 Resolves of 1967, c. 69. 
5 N.Y. Labor Law §593 (McKinney 1965); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §31-236(4)(a) 
(1960). 
6 Resolves of 1967, c. 70. 
§12.16. 1 G.L.. c. 149, §§178G-178N. In the first full fiscal year since the enact-
ment of legislation granting collective bargaining rights to municipal employees, 
the Labor Relations Commission received and processed 199 petitions by labor 
organizations and municipalities seeking elections. along with thirteen charges of 
unfair labor practices involving municipalities. The increased burden on the Labor 
Relations Commission created by the new statute is best manifested by the fact 
that for the same period the Commission processed only 90 petitions for election· a,nd 
fifteen- charges of unfair labor practices in private industry. 
2 Acts of 1967. c. 514. 
SId .• c. 177. 
§12.I7. 11967 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1071. 227 N.E.2d 735, also noted in §12.I3 supra. 
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resident students and faculty. Since 1959, Wheaton had contracted to 
have Saga Food Service of Massachusetts, Inc., a Massachusetts busi-
ness corporation, conduct the daily operation of this food program 
in the college dining halls. 
Students paid Wheaton a comprehensive fee for tuition, room and 
board, and Wheaton, in turn, paid Saga a contracted amount. Through 
this and similar arrangements, Saga received gross receipts of over 
$1.2 million a year from its program at Wheaton and from similar 
programs at two other Massachusetts colleges. There was no evidence 
that Wheaton itself realized a profit. Wheaton retained various con-
trols over the program, including a veto power over the discharge 
of employees. Wheaton, therefore, was considered a joint employer 
with Saga in the program.2 
In 1965, the Retail, Wholesale Department Stores Union, AFL-CIO, 
filed a petition with the Massachusetts Labor Relations Commission 
in which it sought certification, pursuant to General Laws, Chapter 
150A, Section 5(c), as exclusive bargaining agent for the food pro-
gram's employees. The Commission postponed hearings on the peti-
tion while the union filed a similar petition with the National Labor 
Relations Board. The NLRB declined to assert its jurisdiction 
... on the authority of Young Men's Christian Association of 
Portland, Oregon3 ••• and Crotty Brothers, New York, Inc.4 ••• 
and because the business of the instant employer [Saga] is di-
rectly related to and closely connected with the operation of a 
non-profit institution.5 [Footnotes supplied.] 
Following the NLRB dismissal, the Commission resumed hearings 
on the petition, denying motions to dismiss brought by Wheaton and 
Saga. These latter parties then petitioned the Supreme Judicial Court 
for a writ of prohibition to prevent the Commission from hearing 
the union's petition. 
Saga and Wheaton argued that the state was preempted from assert-
ing jurisdiction over their activities because the conduct involved 
came within federal jurisdiction by virtue of the National Labor Re-
lations Act.6 The Commission answered that Sections 14(c)(I) and 
(2) of the NLRA7 specifically enabled it to assert jurisdiction in such 
matters where federal agencies decline to do SO.8 The parties also 
placed in issue whether the dispute presented a "question affecting 
2 See Stipulation 2, Reservation and Report at 9. 
3 146 N.L.R.B. 20 (1964). 
4146 N.L.R.B. 755 (1964). 
5 Letter from Regional Director Alpert to Nutter, McClennen &: Fish, Feb. II, 
1965. The Union's petition was docketed with the NLRB Regional Director as 
Case No. l-RC-8219. No Regional Director decision was issued with regard to the 
petition; the dismissal was made in accordance with a letter sent by the Regional 
Director to Wheaton's counsel. Id. 
6 Brief for Petitioners at 7-11. 
7 NLRA §§14(c)(I), (2), 29 U.S.C. §§164(C)(I), (2) (1964). 
8 Brief for Respondents at 4-9. 
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industry and trade" as was required for the Commission to possess 
jurisdiction under state law.9 The Court, assuming, without deciding, 
that there was no federal bar against the Commission's assertion of ju-
risdiction HELD: there was no "question affecting industry and trade" 
as required by state statute. State policy, therefore, would be contro-
verted if the Commission were to assert jurisdiction. 
The federal question raised by this case, and avoided by the Su-
preme Judicial Court, was whether a state agency may assert juris-
diction over an activity when the NLRB declines to assert its jurisdic-
tion on the basis that the activity was closely involved with a non-profit, 
educational institution. This question is important in that it affects 
future judicial or legislative action on the state level. 
State agencies have been held to be barred from exercising juris-
diction over any labor questions involving conduct which is "arguably 
protected" or "arguably prohibited" under the NLRA.10 This, in 
effect, means that a state may not attempt to exercise jurisdiction 
over any labor disputes which might, with some degree of justifica-
tion, be said to be within the coverage of the NLRA. 
It was held in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon11 
that the mere fact that the NLRB disposes of a case by declining to 
assert jurisdiction is no indication that the matter is not arguably 
within the scope of the act. This was said to be true because such a 
declination "does not define the nature of the activity with unclouded 
legal significance."12 In Hanna Mining Co. v. District 2, Marine En-
gineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIOp it was held, however, that 
a state might assert jurisdiction based upon a refusal by the NLRB's 
General Counsel to file a charge, although this type of disposition had 
been cited in Garmon as another type which does not adequately de-
fine the nature of the activity.14 The Hanna Court made clear, how-
ever, that its decision was not a departure from Garmon because the 
disposition by the NLRB had been "illuminated by explanations that 
do squarely define the nature of the activity"15 and show the activity 
to be outside the scope of the NLRA. The Court relied heavily upon 
the NLRB's finding that the engineers involved there were super-
visors and therefore expressly excluded by Section 2(3) of the NLRA16 
from the class of "employees" covered by the act. 
The NLRB's policy of not asserting jurisdiction in cases such as 
Wheaton, was most fully explained in Trustees of Columbia Uni-
versity in the City of New York,17 That decision was based upon a 
9 Brief for Petitioners at 3-7, Brief for Respondents at 9-13. 
10 E.g., San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
11 Id., and cases cited. 
12 Id. at 246. 
13382 U.S. 181 (1965). 
14 359 U.S. at 245-246. 
15382 U.S. at 192. 
16 NLRA §2(3), 29 U.S.C. §152(3) (1964). 
1797 N.L.R.B. 424 (1951). 
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finding that Congress intended that the NLRB would not assert ju-
risdiction over "a nonprofit, educational institution where the activi-
ties involved are noncommercial in nature and intimately connected 
with the charitable purposes and educational activities of the insti-
tution."18 This policy of Congress was not written into the act as 
Congress believed that such activities would be excluded in any event 
because of a lack of any substantial effect on interstate commerce.19 
The Court in Trustees of Columbia went on to hold that, despite the 
fact that the policy was not written into the legislation, the NLRB, 
in its discretion, should implement this policy since the intent of 
Congress was clear. 
Nonetheless, the fact that the policy is not written into the act 
would seem to distinguish such a case from Hanna, where the Court 
relied upon the express exclusion of supervisors from coverage by 
the act. The fact that the NLRB speaks of "declining to assert juris-
diction" would seem to argue in favor of the view that the NLRB does 
possess jurisdiction under the NLRA. State agencies, therefore, would 
appear to be preempted from assuming jurisdiction unless an express 
federal statutory provision permits such assumption of jurisdiction. 
The Commission argued that Sections 14(c)(I) and (2) of the NLRA 
provide for such state jurisdiction in the present case. These sections 
state: 
(1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by 
published rules adopted pursuant to the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute 
involving any class or category of employers, where, in the opinion 
of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is 
not sufficiently substantial to warrant the exercise of its jurisdic-
tion; Provided, That the Board shall not decline to assert juris-
diction over any labor dispute over which it would assert 
jUrisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August I, 1959. 
(2) Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar 
any agency or the courts of any State or Territory ... from as-
suming and asserting jurisdiction over labor disputes over which 
the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (I) of this subsection, 
to assert jurisdiction.20 
The petitioners argued, however, that in enacting these sections, 
Congress only intended to remove the specific "no man's land" result-
ing from the NLRB's refusal to accept jurisdiction over activities in-
volving less than stated dollar· amounts of trade; the NLRB adopted 
these monetary standards because it was not administratively feasible 
to accept jurisdiction over the vast number of cases within its exclusive 
jurisdiction. The petitioners contended that the statutory sections 
18 Id. at 427. 
19 H.R. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1947). 
20 NLRA §§14(c)(I), (2), 29 U.S.C. §§I64(c)(I), (2) (1964). 
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should be narrowly construed as applying only to cases declined on 
the basis of a failure to meet the monetary standards.21 Such an in-
terpretation would seem to be supported in an explanation by the 
United States Supreme Court of the scope of Section 14(c)(I): "The 
'standards' to which §14(c)(I) refers are the minimum dollar amounts 
established by the Board for jurisdictional purposes ... ,"22 The peti-
tioners further argued that the Board's decision to decline to assert 
jurisdiction over non-profit organizations' activities was not based on 
a failure to satisfy the monetary standards but rather was based on a 
decision to leave such organizations unregulated in their labor rela-
tions. Accordingly, Section 14(c)(I) and (2) would not be applicable. 
It is submitted, however, that this interpretation of Sections 14(c)(I) 
and (2) is too narrow. The primary concern of these sections is those 
situations where the NLRB declines jurisdiction because of an in-
sufficient effect on interstate commerce. In Cuss v. Utah Labor Rela-
tions Board,23 the Supreme Court pointed out that the NLRB may 
decline to assert jurisdiction on the theory that interstate commerce 
is not sufficiently affected, not only where the particular activity lacks 
sufficient monetary substance, but also where the industry involved 
is "more or less typically local."24 The Court recognized that, in the 
absence of a specific federal provision enabling the states to assert 
jurisdiction in such areas, the NLRB's refusal to assert jurisdiction 
would result in a "no man's land" in both categories of cases.25 
In McColloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, the 
Supreme Court indicated that it would consider both categories of 
cases to be included within the scope of Section 14(c)(I) in stating that 
"the problem to which §14(c) is addressed is the 'no man's land' cre-
ated by Cuss v. Utah Labor Relations Board . ... "26 Sections 14(c)(I) 
and (2) would thus appear to be operative whenever the NLRB de-
clines jurisdiction, both because its minimum monetary standards are 
not met or because the industry involved is local in nature. 
In Wheaton, it seems clear that the NLRB did not decline to hear 
the union's petition based upon a failure to meet the monetary 
standards. The petitioners' contention that Saga's operations met 
these standards27 went uncontested by the Commission and was as-
sumed by the Supreme Judicial Court.28 It is probable that Wheaton 
also met these standards.29 It would appear, therefore, that the NLRB 
refused jurisdiction because the activity, intimately connected with 
21 Brief for Petitioners at 7-11. 
22 McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20 
n.l0 (1962). 
23353 U.S. 1 (1957). 
24 Id. at 8-9. 
25Id. at 10. 
26372 U.S. 10, 20 n.IO (1962). 
27 Brief for Petitioners at 7-8. 
281967 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1073, 227 N.E.2d at 737. 
29 See Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York, 97 N.L.R.B. 
424, 425 (1951). 
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the non-profit, educational institution, was considered local in na-
ture.so This view finds support in Utah Labor Relations Board v. 
Utah Valley Hospital,31 where the Supreme Court of Utah found it to 
be a policy of the NLRA that the state, and not the federal govern-
ment, should regulate non-profit educational institutions, since they 
are essentially local in character because they frequently assist the state 
in carrying out its essential functions.32 Therefore, since the NLRB's 
refusal of jurisdiction would come within Section 14(c)(I), the state 
could assert jurisdiction under Section 14(c)(2). The Supreme Judicial 
Court's assumption, in Wheaton, that the state Board would have ju-
risdiction, would appear to be correct. 
The Supreme Judicial Court, in Wheaton, however, found a bar to 
the state Commission's assertion of jurisdiction. The Commission as-
serted jurisdiction under General Laws, Chapter 150A, Section 5(c), 
which provides for certification of bargaining representatives in cases 
affecting industry and trade. The Court, however, held that the statute 
was inapplicable because the "non-commercial" undertakings of non-
profit, educational institutions do not give rise to questions affecting 
"industry and trade." The Court considered the activity in this case 
to be non-commercial because: (1) the dining facilities were not open 
to the public; (2) the facilities did not realize a profit, in the sense 
that consumers paid more for the services than they cost; and (3) the 
employers and employees were engaged in the furtherance of Whea-
ton's educational purposes. The Court did not consider Saga's in-
volvement relevant even though it was a commercial enterprise which 
did realize a profit. 
The Court believed that its interpretation of the state statute was 
controlled by Saint Luke's Hospital v. Labor Relations Commission.s3 
In Saint Luke'S, a non-profit hospital sought a declaration that the 
Commission could not assert its jurisdiction over a union's representa-
tion petition. The hospital's employees were engaged as cafeteria, 
laundry and domestic workers serving the hospital's patients. The 
hospital itself was the sole employer and there was no evidence of 
any profit being realized by the hospital. The Court held that Gen-
eral Laws, Chapter 150A, Section 5(c), did not enable the Commis-
30 But d. State of Maryland v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826, 832-834 (D. Md. 1964). 
Assuming that the local character of these institutions was the basis of the NLRB's 
decision not to assert jurisdiction, it may be argued that the involvement of Saga, 
a commercial food supplier, should alter this result. However, since the basis of 
the federal policy is a specific desire to leave questions involving a non-profit 
educational institution's activities to the states, it would not seem an abuse of its 
discretion for the NLRB to effectuate this policy by declining jurisdiction even 
though the substantial operations of a commercial enterprise are also involved. 
31235 P.2d 520 (Utah 1951). See Utah Valley Hospital v. Industrial Commission 
of Utah, 199 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952), which held on the same facts that the state 
commission was not barred from asserting jurisdiction. 
32235 P.2d at 522-524. 
33320 Mass. 467, 70 N.E.2d 10 (1946). 
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sion to assert jurisdiction over operations which do not "affect indus-
try and trade" and that industry and trade are not affected by a 
non-profit organization's "non-commercial" activities. 
The Court's interpretation, in Saint Luke's, of Chapter 150A, Sec-
tion 5(c), may be attacked as an overly narrow construction of the 
term "affecting industry or trade." The term "affecting" is generally 
given a broad statutory meaning. Thus, in a non-labor case in Massa-
chusetts, "affected" was defined broadly as meaning "acted upon, 
moved, or changed."s4 Even if the hospital itself was not engaged in 
industry and trade, therefore, it might be argued that industry and 
trade would be sufficiently affected if, for example, a work stoppage 
by the hospital employees would produce a great effect on commercial 
suppliers to the hospital.s/) Under this interpretation, activities of the 
hospital, and of the college in the instant case, would come within the 
ambit of the statute, and the Commission would, therefore, have ju-
risdiction. 
Even if the Saint Luke's interpretation is accepted, however, it is 
submitted that it should not control the present case. The Saint Luke's 
Court did not hold that the presence of a non-profit organization's 
non-commercial activity necessarily precludes the operation of the 
statute, as though a specific exclusion clause to this effect were writ-
ten into the statute. The Court merely held that such activities, in 
themselves, bear no relation to industry and trade and, therefore, are 
not, on their own strength, a basis for the Commission's jurisdiction. 
If, however, such an activity simultaneously involves a business cor-
poration's profit-making venture, as in the present case, it would not 
be inconsistent with the Saint Luke's decision to hold that industry 
and trade would be affected within the meaning of the statute. The 
Court, in Wheaton, however, did not consider the presence of a com-
mercial employer to be relevant. Thus, the Court interpreted the 
Massachusetts statute as though it specifically exempted non-commer-
cial activities in furtherance of a non-profit, educational institution's 
functions. Such a statutory interpretation appears to be without foun-
dation in the language of the statute. 
The Wheaton Court conceded that in reaching its interpretation of 
the statute it relied not only upon the language of the statute itself, 
but also upon what it said was the state's policy of not asserting juris-
diction when the activities of a non-profit organization are involved. 
The Wheaton Court cited no evidence that the state legislature ever 
expressed an intent that a non-profit, educational organization's non-
commercial activities should be exempt from the Commission's juris-
diction. The criticism in NLRB v. Central Dispensary & Emergency 
34 Lyons v. Elston, 211 Mass. 478, 481, 98 N.E. 93, 94 (1912). See State of Mary-
land v. Wirtz, 269 F. Supp. 826, 832-834 (D. Md. 1967). 
35 This argument was advanced by the Commission in the present case, but was 
rejected by the Court. Brief for Respondents at 13. 
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Hospital36 of a similar public policy finding in Western Pennsylvania 
Hospital v. Lichliter37 is applicable here: 
In the interpretation of its state labor relations act the Penn-
sylvania court held that even though the words might be broad 
enough to include a hospital, nevertheless they could not con-
ceive that the legislature intended to apply the act to such in-
stitutions .... We cannot understand what considerations of 
public policy deprive these employees of the privilege granted to 
the employees of other institutions.38 
The Court, in Wheaton, attempted to justify its policy finding by 
noting that it is federal policy to decline to assert jurisdiction over such 
questions. The Court cited Hathaway Bakeries, Inc. v. Labor Relations 
Commission,39 which had held that since the state labor relations 
statute was modeled after the federal statute, the policy found to 
underline the federal statute should be applied in construing the state 
statute. The Court, however, neglected to determine the rationale 
behind the federal policy. If this federal policy, as has been suggested,40 
is based upon a belief that these matters should be left to the states, it 
would be absurd for the state to rely on the federal policy as support 
for its own decision not to assert jurisdiction. 
Surprisingly, the Court did not even explain the rationale behind 
its own policy of not asserting jurisdiction. In other jurisdictions, how-
ever, such a policy has been based most often upon a belief that the 
public has an interest in the smooth functioning of these worthwhile 
organizations and that "union organization will interfere with the 
kind of discipline necessary for the effective operation" of these in-
stitutions.41 This assumption that union recognition heightens the 
danger of work stoppages is disputed by recent studies which tend to 
show that most strikes in non-profit institutions are actually a result 
of a thwarted demand for union recognition and that union represen-
tation minimizes the motivation to strike by allowing for alternatives 
such as arbitration.42 Furthermore, the present exemption of non-
profit institutions results in discrimination against the employees of 
such institutions, who now not only must contend with wages which 
are far lower than those of employees doing similar work for com-
mercial employers, but also must work under conditions which are 
dramatically substandard.43 
The Court's holding runs against the modern trend to extend the 
36 145 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1944). 
37340 Pa. 382, 17 A.2d 206 (1941). 
38145 F.2d at 853. 
39316 Mass. 136, 55 N.E.2d 254 (1944). 
40 See Utah Labor Relations Board v. Utah Valley Hospital, 235 P.2d 520, 522-
524 (Utah 1951) . 
. 41 Vladeck, Collective Bargaining iIl Voluntary Hospitals and Other Non-Profit 
Operations, 19 NYU Conference on Labor 221, 232 (1966). 
42 Bader, Collective Bargaining in Hospitals and Other Non-Profit Operations, 
19 NYU Conference on Labor 235, 262 (1966). 
43 Vladeck, note 41 supra, at 222. 
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privilege of collective bargaining to increasing numbers of employees 
of non-profit institutions.44 While extending recognition to employees 
of non-profit institutions could not be accomplished without under-
mining the Saint Luke's doctrine, the fact that denying these em-
ployees the right of collective bargaining creates undesirable results 
would seem to be a sufficient basis for not extending the Saint Luke's 
doctrine by creating an exemption wherever a non-profit, educational 
institution's non-commercial activities are involved. 
RAYMOND A. NOBLE 
44 See Acts of 1964, c. 567 (confers the benefits of G.L., c. 150A, §5 (c) , on nurses 
in non.profit health care facilities); N.Y. Laws 1966, c. 685 (extends guarantees of 
collective bargaining to various types of employees of non-profit organizations 
including those working in a "restaurant" of an educational institution); Johnson 
v. Christ Hospital, 84 N.J. Super. 541, 202 A.2d 874 (Super. Ct. Ch. 1964); Local 
No. 1644, AFSC &: ME, AFL-CIO v. Oakwood Hospital Corp., 367 Mich. 79, 116 
N.W.2d 314 (1962); Utah Labor Relations Board v. Utah Valley Hospital, 235 P.2d 
520 (Utah 1951); Wisconsin Employment Relations Board v. Evangelical Deaconess 
Society of Wisconsin, 242 Wis. 78, 7 N.W.2d 590 (1943); Northwestern Hospital of 
Minneapolis v. Public Bldg. Service Employees' Union Local No. 113, 208 Minn. 
389, 294 N.W. 215 (1940). But see St. Luke's Hospital v. Industrial Comm'n, 349 
P.2d 995 (Colo. 1960). 
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